Dr. Ron Pundak, June 2001
“From Oslo to Taba:
What Went Wrong?”
Introduction
Three approaches can be distinguished
regarding the question of what went wrong with the peace process, which
began in Oslo. The first approach maintains that peace between Israelis
and Palestinians was, and remains, impossible. The second claims that
such a peace can be reached but that the two constituencies are as yet
unable to acknowledge that it is the only option and are therefore
unready to make the necessary and painful concessions. Finally, the
third approach counters that the opportunity for peace did in fact
exist, but that it was squandered due to the misperception of each of
the sides regarding the real interests of the other party, and to the
faulty implementation and management of the entire process. This paper
focuses on the third approach.
The uprising, which began the morning
after the visit of the then opposition leader and now Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount/ Harem-ash-Sharif, on September 28th
2000, did not begin with the first rock thrown by a Palestinian youth, or
shooting by a “Tanzim” activist. The rock and the rifle, and in
particular the demonstrations and clashes of Palestinians with IDF
forces, are tied to the events of the past seven years since the signing
of the Oslo Agreement. Sharon’s visit, and the killing of worshippers on
the plazas of Jerusalem’s mosques on the following day, was the match
that ignited the powder keg, which had threatened to explode for years.
The tenure of former Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu (1996-1999), made it clear to the Palestinians that
an elected Israeli Government might actually not be interested in
reaching a peace agreement on the basis of the principle of United
Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 242 (land for peace). This,
together with the immense gap between the expectations raised by his
successor Ehud Barak’s Government and the grim reality (the continuation
of settlements, lives in the shadow of checkpoints, an unstable economic
situation and other elements which will be described below) had an
unmitigated effect on Palestinian public opinion. The Palestinian public
and the “street” leadership – which originally was an enthusiastic
supporter of the peace process and of the need to reach reconciliation
with Israel – came to the conclusion that Israel did not in fact want to
reach a fair agreement to end the occupation and grant the Palestinian
people “legitimate rights”.
In particular, from the moment when the
five years of the Interim Agreement period expired and a Permanent
Status was not even visible on the horizon, the clock began to tick
towards the explosion. For Israel, the only way to prevent the
detonation was to effect the agreements signed with the Palestinians
rapidly and seriously, and to embark promptly on intensive Permanent
Status negotiations. Prime Minister Ehud Barak failed to understand
this. Indeed, his error was twofold: he decided not to implement the
third redeployment, which represented the single most important element
in the Interim Agreement; and although he entered into negotiations on
Permanent Status earnestly and in goodwill, he did so on the basis of
faulty basic assumptions which caused their collapse.
This paper will offer an
non-exhaustive and selective examination of what went wrong on the road
from Oslo to Taba, and aims to shed light on the Palestinian perspective
to which Israelis are not generally exposed.
The Process of Implementation and the Netanyahu
Government
The relative failure of the Oslo
process can be traced back to the beginning of the period of
implementation of the DOP Agreement. The “Oslo Spirit” which influenced
the two leaderships, neither permeated to the level of the Israelis who
formulated the complicated system of the implementation agreements (the
“Gaza and Jericho Agreement” and the Interim Agreement of September
1995), nor to the Israeli officials who were in charge of negotiating
with the Palestinians on translating the agreements into concrete
actions.
The “Oslo Spirit” was based on the
understanding that the negative history between our two peoples
represents an almost insurmountable obstacle for conventional-type
negotiations, taking as a point of departure the existing imbalance of
power between the occupier and the occupied. Our goal was to work
towards a conceptual change, which would lead to a dialogue based, as
much as possible, on fairness, equality and common objectives. These
values were to be reflected both in the character of the negotiations –
including the personal relationships between the negotiators – and in
the proffered solutions and implementation. This new type of
relationship was supposed to influence the type and character of
Palestinian-Israeli talks, which would develop between other official
and semi-governmental institutions in the future, as well as future
dialogue between the two peoples.
For many years, the two peoples had
tried to attain achievements at the expense of the other side. Every
victory won by one side was considered a defeat for the other, according
to the principles of the “zero-sum game” theory. In contrast, “Oslo”
was, from the start, guided by efforts to abandon this approach, and to
achieve as many win-win situations as possible, notwithstanding that the
balance of power was tipped in Israel’s favor.
Agreements were signed, various
responsibilities and spheres of authority were passed on to the
Palestinians, but the basic Israeli attitude towards the Palestinians
continued unabated, and the patronizing attitude of occupier to occupied
remained. It was not replaced by a relationship of equality required of
former adversaries headed in a new political and historical direction.
In parallel, the Palestinians tended to underestimate the painful
significance for Israel of the murderous terrorist attacks by Hamas and
the Islamic Jihad, which only intensified following the signing of the
Oslo Agreement, and of the incitement conducted openly by the
Palestinian side. Instead of actively pursuing the inciters and
demonstrating a 100% commitment to fighting terrorism and its
infrastructure which simultaneously hurt Israel and the Peace Process,
the PA attempted both to coordinate counter-terrorist measures with
Israel and to present a “soft” attitude in dealing with its leadership,
infrastructure and activists.
The three-year tenure of the
Netanyahu Government, which according to the timetable should have seen
the climax of the implementation of the Interim Agreement and of
negotiations on Permanent Status, established new rules of the game and
served only to reduce the hope of Israelis and Palestinians alike. From
a political point of view this period can be characterized in a single
word: failure. Palestinians, the Arab world and the wide circles in the
international community raised the question: does Israel really want
peace? If the peace process had indeed developed as planned and led to
the signing of an agreement with the Palestinians, history would have
smiled at the irony that the Netanyahu Government, despite all
predictions to the contrary, introduced the Middle East into an era of
peace. But true to character, Netanyahu sabotaged the peace process
relentlessly, and made every effort to delegitimize the Palestinian
partner. At the same time, the reality forced Netanyahu to continue,
albeit reluctantly and in limited fashion, the implementation of the
process. The Americans imposed the Wye Agreement on him, which
symbolized the implementation of the second redeployment according to
the Interim Agreement.
Netanyahu’s “ultimate weapon” in his
campaign against the Palestinians was the mantra that the other side was
not fulfilling its part of the agreements and that without mutuality
Israel would not implement its part. In practice, during Netanyahu’s
tenure, both sides committed breaches with regard to the Agreement, but
the breaches of the Israeli side were both more numerous and more
substantive in nature. The Palestinians did not stop the vitriolic
propaganda against Israel by radio, the printed press, television and
schoolbooks; did not collthe illegal firearms; did not reach an
agreement with Israel on the de facto growth of their Police Force; and
did not prove that they were wholeheartedly combating fundamentalist
terrorism, including the imprisonment of its activists.
Israel on its part did not implement
the three stages of the second redeployment, i.e. did not leave
territories which were supposed to be transferred to the Palestinians;
completed only one section out of four with regard to the freeing of
Palestinian prisoners; did not undertake the implementation of the safe
passage which was supposed to connect the West Bank and Gaza; repeatedly
delayed the permit to build the airport and maritime port in Gaza;
prevented the transfer of monies belonging to the PA for extended
periods of time; and continued to establish new settlements, to annex
territories for new settlements and to expand existing ones.
The Palestinians were humiliated. The
foot-dragging combined with the arrogance of the Israeli Government, and
in particular of its Prime Minister, in their relations with the
Palestinian public and its leaders, undermined their belief in the
process. The Palestinian message to the Israeli peace camp towards the
end of Netanyahu’s tenure and election of Barak was clear: an erosion of
hope and faith was taking place. The Palestinian “street” and its
leadership interpreted Israel’s policy as seeking to destroy the very
core of the Palestinian national dream. Moreover, they warned, if this
trend continued Israel would find itself without a partner. The Fatah
movement – the cornerstone of the Palestinian support for peace – would
be replaced by the Hamas as the dominating popular movements.
The Barak Era
The new Government of Barak took
office in the spring of 1999. It was met with high expectations. The
window of opportunity which had been identified during the Madrid
Conference in 1991 and unlocked in Oslo in 1993, was still waiting to be
thrown open. In 1999, the political situation in the region was ripe for
a breakthrough, but time was scarce. Nevertheless, the Palestinian
leadership was still able to contain the violence, which could easily
have erupted during Netanyahu’s tenure. The Palestinian public seethed
not merely in response to the delaying of the final dates of the Interim
Agreement, but mainly from its growing conviction that the Netanyahu
Government – like that of Shamir before him – had no intention of moving
towards peace. The average Palestinian in the West Bank and Gaza
continued to experience humiliating treatment, new settlements were
established both on and off expropriated land, and the general
perception was of continued occupation.
Barak should have taken as his
guiding principle Ben Gurion’s pragmatic approach, which Rabin employed
to such success. This approach is based on the real interests of Israel,
rather than on a pressure group or messianic- or security-oriented
lobbies, and its actions were designed to achieve its goals. In the
final event, Barak quoted Ben Gurion and wished to emulate him, while in
fact he implemented policies which bore a Ben Gurionistic vision but
actually more closely resembled – in terms of results – those of Golda
Meir prior to the October 1973 war.
The version of events, which was fed
to the Israeli public during Barak’s tenure, was different from the
reality on the ground. The “Oslo years” under Barak did not see the end
of the Israeli occupational mentality, did not enable real Palestinian
control over the three million citizens of the PA, did not bring an end
to building in the settlements or to the expropriation of land, and did
not enable economic growth in the territories. In addition, Barak’s
repeated statements that he was the only Prime Minister who had not
transferred land to the Palestinians raised questions for many about his
sincerity. The suspicions increased once it became clear to the
Palestinians that Barak would not transfer the three villages on the
outskirts of Jerusalem (Abu Dis, Al Eyzaria and Arab Sawahra) to PA
control after both the Government and the Knesset had approved the
transfer.
For the average Palestinian during
Barak’s administration, the so-called “fruits of peace” were hardly
encouraging: closures which were interpreted as collective punishment;
restrictions on movement which affected almost all Palestinians; a
permit-issuing system which mainly hurt decent people already cleared by
Israeli security; mistreatment at IDF and Border Police checkpoints
often aimed, on purpose, at PA officials; a dramatic decrease in
employment opportunities in Israel, leading to increased unemployment
and the creation of new pockets of poverty; water shortages during the
summer months as opposed to the abundance of water supply in the Israeli
settlements; the destruction of Palestinian homes while new houses were
built in the settlements; the non-release of prisoners tried for
activities committed before Oslo; Israeli restrictions on building
outside Areas A and B; and the establishment of Bantustan-like areas,
controlled according to the whim of Israeli military rule and on
occasion dictated by its symbiotic relationship with the settlers’
movement. The settlers, for their part, did everything within their
power to obstruct the spirit and word of the Oslo Agreement. The result
was a relentless struggle, over land resources, with the settlers often
receiving the tacit backing of the IDF and the civil administration in
the West Bank (a majority of whose staff are themselves settlers).
This difficult situation was
magnified by the deep disappointment felt by Palestinians due to the
failing governing style of the PA, the discovery of corruption among
politicians, the administrative arm, and the security and police
apparatuses. These institutions treated the Palestinian public in a
manner, which was far from acceptable democratic norms. The Palestinians
came to hate the political elite, which had been imported from Tunis, as
well as the local leadership, which rapidly conformed to the corrupt
standards of the “Tunisians”. The tension between the “street” and the
senior officials continued to grow. In this context it proved
comfortable for the PA to blame Israel for every problem, which arose.
Precisely at this delicate and
complex point, the PA should have reassessed its relationship with the
Palestinian public, as well as its relations with the Israeli public.
Without the support of these two constituencies any hope of peace and
stability was lost. Vis a vis the Palestinian public, the PA should have
implemented radical reforms; “cleaned the stables”; created transparent
and trustworthy financial systems; fired corrupt senior officials;
reorganized the institutions of the PA; and fostered an enthusiastic
state-building enterprise which would attract Palestinians from abroad
to join the national effort. The PA implemented none of these actions.
Chairman Arafat continued to rule by the obsolete methods brought from
Tunis. This attitude permeated the political and public spheres in a
destructive fashion, increasing the hatred of the public towards its
leadership.
The Palestinian leadership’s attitude
towards the Israeli public was equally erroneous. Instead of promoting
messages which would bring home to Israelis the Palestinian problem and
the many difficulties they faced – e.g. humanitarian, national and
political aspects – the Israeli public was met with a barrage of
declarations of war (Jihad), terrorist attacks, daily propaganda which
could even be interpreted as anti-Semitic and the (mistaken) sentiment
that the Palestinian side does not desire peace. President Sadat
captured the hearts of Israelis, and King Hussein brought them to like
him as a person. This was completely alien to Arafat. Neither he nor the
Palestinian leadership did anything in order to coax and persuade the
center-left portion of the Israeli public, a constituency that
represented their natural ally.
This situation made it easy for Barak
to continue the status quo. Sufficient efforts were not made on the
Israeli side – both in the governmental and the public spheres – to
alter the basic assumptions (“changing the hadisk”) regarding the
Palestinians. Official Israeli institutions continued – often without
being aware of it – to place more obstacles in the way of implementation
of the various agreements, and hinder development in areas and spheres
handed over to PA control and responsibility. This trend can be seen for
example in the various economic restrictions, which were imposed, and in
the hindrance of the development of industrial zones. As a rule, the
Israeli side claimed that “security considerations hold priority over
all others”. This position dictated – in the first period of
implementation – the many closures imposed on the West Bank and Gaza,
which prevented the Palestinian population from injecting an essential
flow of funds to the Palestinian economy through regular work in Israel.
Imposition of closures became the prevailing norm, turning into an
instinctive reaction, imposed even when not required by security
considerations. It has since been proved that the relation between
closures and the deterrence of terrorism remained minimal. They were
instead employed as a psychological device aimed at the Israeli public,
proof that “something is being done”.
Moreover, the political leadership in
Israel was fearful all along – due to mistaken electoral considerations
– of revealing to the public what should have been the true message of
the period of implementation of the Oslo accords, namely that the entire
process was intended to result in a Permanent Status Agreement, its
essence being a peace agreement through the creation of a Palestinian
state in the majority of the occupied territories, with its capital in
Arab East Jerusalem, and a respectable solution – both practical and
symbolic – to the refugee issue.
The Policies and Politics of Ehud Barak
From the
outset, Barak caused a feeling of ambiguity in the Palestinian
leadership. On the one hand he appeared serious and determined to reach
a permanent status agreement that would include all outstanding issues.
On the other hand, he conveyed right-wing messages, particularly with
regard to the “price” he was willing to pay in return for an agreement.
Former Minister Haim Ramon (in an interview to “Zman Tel Aviv” March 2,
2001) explains that: “When Barak said ‘we cannot give assets if there is
no permanent status agreement,’ he used right-wing terminology. One of
the problems was that Barak promised them [the Palestinians] and didn’t
deliver. Barak refused to implement the agreement on the third
redeployment as Israel had promised [in the Interim Agreement of
September 1995]. He said, ‘if we give, they will receive and will not be
satisfied’.”
In the
article, Ramon relates to Barak’s first political maneuver, in which he
actually forced the Sharm A-Sheikh Agreement of September 1999 on the
Palestinians, according to which the third redeployment would be
postponed to a date agreed upon in the Agreement. Ultimately, however,
contrary to this agreement, Barak failed to implement the third
redeployment. The logic was similar to that which guided him immediately
after the Oslo Accords: Israel should not relinquish assets before it
was completely certain of the nature of the final agreement. While the
basic logic of Barak’s approach can be either accepted or challenged,
the fact is that this approach was presented to the Palestinians along
with public declarations announcing his affinity for the leadership of
the National Religious Party (NRP) and the settlers, and that UNSCR 242
does not include the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians concluded that
Barak – much like Netanyahu – was not willing to reach a fair agreement.
Barak’s
first strategic mistake, as Prime Minister, was his decision to defer
the Palestinian track in favor of an attempt to conclude a peace
agreement with Syria. In light of the dismal relations that had
developed between the Netanyahu government, and the Palestinians, and in
light of initial Palestinian fears regarding Barak’s intentions, and
even though Barak’s maneuver might have seemed logical to him and his
advisors – but not so to many experts – he should have initiated a
special meeting with Arafat – who expected an invitation. At such a
meeting the priorities of the Prime Minister could have been explained
and possible measures (such as specific redeployment and/or releasing
prisoners) discussed, which would serve to alleviate the burden on the
Palestinian leadership and public during this uncertain waiting period,
thus assuring the Palestinians that one track of negotiation did not
exclude the other.
Barak did
not adopt this approach. He concentrated instead on the Syrian track,
which eventually reached – some might say by his own fault – a dead end.
Moreover, the Prime Minister rejected Arafat’s request to freeze the
construction of settlements during negotiations, and did so primarily in
order to maintain his coalition with the NRP, although he did announce
that no new settlements would be established. When settlers began
constructing dozens of illegal hilltop strongholds, which the
Palestinians considered new settlements, Barak missed an opportunity to
send a conspicuous message to the Palestinians and the settlers alike by
removing the strongholds through legal means or even by force. Instead,
he preferred to negotiate and barter with the settlers in order to
remove, retain or duplicate some of the remaining strongholds to other
locations. From the Palestinian point of view, the message was clear
although Barak, apparently, had not meant to convey it as such.
Here, too,
Barak was captive of the mistake made by many Israelis, who view
political and security developments strictly through a pair of Israeli
“glasses.” Barak failed to understand that in negotiating with the
settlers, he was read differently by the Palestinians than he was by
Israelis. He did not understand that in “removing Arafat’s mask” in
order to “see if Arafat could make tough choices,” he actually unveiled
the truth under the mask behind which he and a majority of Israelis
disguised themselves, consciously or subconsciously. The Israeli public
and leadership were not prepared, or had not been prepared, to pay the
necessary price for a peace agreement. In the aforementioned article,
Ramon describes his answer to the Prime Minister’s question whether
Arafat was prepared to pay the price for peace. He asked “Are we ready?
Did we remove settlements? Have you already divided Jerusalem?” Ramon’s
conclusion is severe: “Ehud was actually against Oslo, his government
abandoned the path for peace. He said ‘either there will be peace or we
will know who we are talking to’.”
Barak was
not opposed to a peace agreement with the Palestinians. He was honest,
serious and sincere in his quest to conclude a fair Permanent Status
Agreement. Although he was emotionally sympathetic to Gush Emunim, and
his mental setup was formed by 35 years in the military, rationally
Barak was “left-wing”, positioning himself politically left of many of
the leaders of the peace camp in all matters relating to permanent
status. He understood that the occupation corrupts Israel, and he
comprehended the Palestinian desire for a state. He even admitted on
television, that if he were Palestinian he would almost certainly have
become a freedom fighter in one of the terrorist organizations. However,
this ambivalence reflecting the contradiction between his emotions and
his rationality, created a dissonance that further amplified his natural
inability to market almost any policy, and especially his
ideological-rational policy.
One of
Barak’s problems was that – while negotiating – he rejected the concept
developed in Oslo and its multi-phase strategy. His “all or nothing”
approach he created brought us to where we are today. The “all or
nothing” approach could have succeeded provided that it was accompanied
by confidence-building measures towards the Palestinian public and the
development of a personal relationship with its leaders. If Barak had
invited them on an “all or nothing” journey, while creating a supportive
environment of trust and hope, we would by now have an agreement between
the two sides.
Another of
Barak’s major fwas his inability to develop personal relations with the
Palestinian leadership, and primarily with Chairman Arafat. Rabin and
Peres, each in his own way, was able to create intimate working
relations with Arafat, the personal nature of which provided a safety
net for crisis resolution, overcoming gaps in negotiations. Barak not
only disparaged the value of such an approach (during almost two weeks
of Talks at Camp David, Barak refused to hold a one-on-one meeting with
Arafat), but he caused Arafat to distrust him. Arafat was quoted as
saying that “Barak is worse than Netanyahu.” The alternative to creating
“chemistry” with Arafat could have been to create a special relationship
with Abu Mazen, his deputy, but here, too, Barak failed. As a result, no
relationship was created which could have helped to bridge over the
difficulties and distrust, which arose during negotiations.
Barak’s
difficulties in working with the Palestinians were not very different
from those he encountered in managing internal Israeli politics. The
issues were different, but the approach was essentially the same. It
began after the elections with the establishment of a non-partisan,
non-political team that was designated to negotiate in order to build a
coalition. He essentially excluded the Labor party leadership from the
process and alienated his partners. In the end, the government was
assembled just two days before the 45-day limit, leaving everyone except
for Barak – who remained smiling – angry, suspicious and exhausted. He
ruptured his relations with Uzi Baram and Ra’anan Cohen (two pillars of
his party); appointed Yossi Beilin and Shlomo Ben Ami to positions
(Justice and Internal Security) which did not match their qualifications
and appointed Haim Ramon as a Minister of little importance in the Prime
Minister’s Office. He also attempted to keep Peres out of the
government. After forming the government, however, he was obliged to
create a special position for Peres as Minister for Regional
Cooperation. He tried to bypass Avrum Burg by nominating someone for the
position of Chairman of the Knesset who had little chancing of winning,
and finally bestowed ministries of high socio-economic importance upon
coalition partners instead of his own party. In response to problems
that emerged from coalition negotiations, Barak replied that he could
not be pressured or blackmailed. If he blinked now, he added, it would
impair his ability to negotiate with President Assad.
With the
establishment of the government, his course of action did not change. He
managed to turn supporters into adversaries. He failed to resolve
internal problems, addressing them only when they had reached a point
when they could barely be solved. He handled the strike of the
physically disabled and the teachers’ strike in a similar manner.
Towards the Israeli-Arabs, of whom 95% had voted for him, he was
condescending from the onset, establishing no framework for cooperation
with the Arab parties or the Arab leadership on the municipal, social
and religious levels. The problem was not one of a lack of will, honesty
or vision, but rather the fact that Barak was the poorest of managers.
The Negotiations on the
Permanent Status between Israel and a Palestinian State
The Oslo Accords basically aimed to
set in motion a process that would bring about – through a Permanent
Status Agreement (PSA) between Israel and the PLO – peace, coexistence,
and decreased probability of confrontation and war. One of the more
substantive issues in this context, relates to whether a PSA should
address and resolve all outstanding issues outlined in the Oslo Accords
(Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders,
relations and cooperation with neighbors, and other issues of common
interest titled “generic issues” such as water and economics), or
whether the resolutions of complicated issues – Jerusalem, refugees,
territorial questions – should be postponed in favor of an agreement
which will leave some issues open for further negotiation.
According to the Oslo Accords, all
issues, especially those that are particularly sensitive and
problematic, will be placed on the negotiating table. Discussions on any
of the issues can therefore be postponed only if agreed upon by both
sides. From the onset of the negotiating process, it should have been
clear to Israel that the Palestinian side was adamantly insistent that
only a comprehensive package addressing all issues of permanent status
would be considered. Israeli debate on whether it was correct for Barak
to discuss Jerusalem and refugee issues is therefore irrelevant, and
demonstrates the dominating feature of Israeli discourse which ignored
the fact that in order to bring about a real resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, no other choice exists but to resolve all
issues on the agenda.
Outstanding issues would leave the
agreement hostage to extremists on both sides, which would continue to
fight in order to thwart the possibility of concluding these issues in
future, negotiations, and thereby leave the process of peace and
reconciliation at their mercy. A PSA must be clear, while its
implementation could be – and perhaps should be – gradual. In any case,
and not as was in Oslo, the ‘End State’ must be clear to both sides.
From a historical-political perspective, being cognizant of possible
complexities and complications, all players – Israel, the Palestinians,
the Arab World including the rejection front, and the international
community – were ripe at this time for an historic step. In this
context, Barak’s decision to work towards this end was both justified
and sound.
Barak was not convinced, upon
entering the negotiations, that Israel had a true partner for peace in
the present Palestinian leadership headed by Arafat. He still wished to
examine whether the Palestinian leadership viewed the peace process as a
strategic decision and whether a critical mass of the Palestinian public
supported Arafat and his way. Barak was prepared to go “all the way” in
order to reach an agreement, leading Israel towards making the necessary
concessions. However, he was not willing to do what was necessary on the
ground in order to prove his intentions, and he expressed extreme
positions in his political statements.
In stark contrast to the hesitations of
the Israeli Prime Minister, the Palestinian leadership and a majority of
the public were willing to negotiate and to make the necessary
concessions, provided that Israel would present clear negotiating
positions that would lead to their strategic goal, and that the reality
of the occupier vs. the occupied would actually change on the ground.
Barak’s negotiating strategy with the
Palestinians was mistaken. He should have presented the principles
underlying the proposed solutions (mainly regarding the territorial
issue) at the early stages of negotiations. This would have provided the
Palestinians with an incentive to move forward with the negotiations,
and their leadership with an opportunity to convince their suffering
public that there was light at the end of the tunnel. Instead, in the
tradition of “Persian Market” bargaining, Barak engaged in foot-dragging
during negotiations. Abu Mazen – the Palestinian architect of the Oslo
Accord and a politician with great experience and understanding – who
wanted to be the Palestinian figure leading the negotiations, repeatedly
recommended that the general principles guiding the Permanent Status
agreement be established at the onset of negotiations. An Israeli
agreement to this would have turned Abu Mazen into a strategic partner
with the political strength to carry the weight of negotiations on his
shoulders. Instead Barak rejected this proposal, fearing he would
“expose” his positions too early in the game. Barak should have
understood that without a presentation of these principles, an agreement
could not be reached. Moreover, by introducing these principles he would
have injected motivation to the Palestinian side and strengthened the
pragmatic camp, which claims, even today, that an agreement with Israel
is possible. The tragic result was that even when Ba“exposed” his
positions at the end of the negotiations, it was too late, and done in a
manner which was not viewed as trustworthy by the Palestinians.
Moreover, by not laying down principles, and leading the negotiations as
he did, Barak weakened the Israeli position and had to concede again and
again without receiving anything in return.
Barak also relied, mistakenly, on the
recommendations of senior Government officials – who in fact were
disconnected from the Palestinian reality on the ground and from its
policies – who advised him that it would be possible to close a deal on
one of two options: either on a Palestinian state in all of Gaza and 80%
of the West Bank, with an annexation of 20% to Israel and without
territorial exchanges in return; or on a Palestinian state in all of
Gaza and 70% of the West Bank, with an annexation of 10% without
territorial exchange, leaving the rest (20%) for future negotiations.
Other experts, and the Intelligence community, in contrast did not
believe that the Palestinian leadership has a margin for territorial
concessions. They emphasized that Arafat’s condition for accepting an
agreement was 100% of the territories, with certain exchanges of
territories in order to accommodate Israel’s special needs and the
reality that had developed on the ground over 30 years of occupation.
Barak did not accept this position, and proceeded to advance territorial
proposals, which had no chance to be a basis for a viable agreement.
Barak failed to grasp that from
Arafat’s and the Palestinian point of view, the Palestinians had already
made the most important territorial concession. There, the Palestinians
accepted for the first time the principle of exercising their
self-determination – i.e. a Palestinian state – on only 22% of mandatory
Palestine. As a result of misreading the Palestinian perspective, Barak
was convinced at the outset that it would be possible to reach an
agreement without territorial exchanges, and the inaccurate conclusion
that the exchange could be based on less than a clear and equitable 1:1
ratio, as Prime Minister Rabin had agreed to in the Peace Agreement with
Jordan in 1994. The Israeli offer at Camp David was based on a map,
which included an annexation of approximately 12% without territorial
compensation. Towards the end of the talks, the Americans made clear to
the Palestinians that the maximal Israeli offer included an annexation
of 9% and a compensation of 1%. In Camp David, Barak didn’t take the
necessary step to reach the desired endpoint, and the version presented
in retrospect by Israeli spokespersons, claiming that Barak at Camp
David offered 95% and an additional 5% in compensation, or alternatively
97% and another 3% compensation, is a form of rewriting history.
This highly responsible man – who
could withstand extremely stressful situations, had amazing powers of
concentration and analytical capacity, and who was used to coping with
new situations – may have failed precisely because of his qualities.
Barak’s approach to negotiation was influenced by arrogance,
single-mindedness and the fallacy that “only I have the big picture, and
only I know and understand it all”. His strategic vision and historical
insight collapsed because he failed to understand how to reach his
important goals. He attempted to impose his game rules on the
negotiations, to force a Barak-like move on an environment, which was
unaccustomed to functioning according to his code.
Barak also recruited the American
administration to this end. In retrospect, it seems that the American
administration – and in particular the State Department – contributed to
the failure of the negotiation process. The traditional approach of the
State Department, which prevailed throughout most of Barak’s tenure, was
to adopt the position of the Israeli Prime Minister. Consequently, the
Palestinians suspected the Americans of not being honest brokers. This
was demonstrated most extremely during the Netanyahu administration,
when the American Government seemed sometimes to be working for
the Israeli Prime Minister, in an effort to convince (and even attempt
to force) the Palestinian side to accept Israeli offers. This pattern of
behavior also was visible during Barak’s tenure. The Israeli line was
adopted by the Americans without sufficient consideration of the
positions and needs of the Palestinian side. With time, President
Clinton and the White House staff developed a more profound
understanding of the Palestinian position, and a willingness to push the
Israelis to alter and roll forward their positions. However, the
behavior of the Palestinian side – mainly during the Camp David Talks –
psychologically eroded this support, causing the Americans to return
instinctively to the traditional pattern of backing Israel’s positions.
President Clinton’s public statement
at the close of the Camp David Talks, to the effect that the Palestinian
side was responsible for its failure, was a mistake. The President’s
position was a reaction to the behavior of the Palestinians during the
Talks, and a personal expression of disappointment. He may also have
been motivated by a desire to assist a friend – Barak – who was in a
difficult political situation at home. The Palestinian Delegation
practiced foot-dragging, its representatives on occasion demonstrated an
unwillingness to fully engage in the discussions, adopted a passive
approach and contradicted each other. Their behavior left a negative
impression on Clinton comparing with the frog leaps undertaken by Barak
who broke taboos and took great personal and political risks.
Nevertheless, Clinton should have been less emotional and more
presidential, and should have understood three basic facts: Firstly, the
Palestinians could not and from the outset were not prepared to complete
the negotiations during a single summit which took place three to five
months before the date set for the end of negotiations. Secondly, the
proposed Israeli positions, while being far-reaching, remained far from
the minimum, which would have enticed the Palestinians to sign an
agreement. And thirdly, to corner Arafat would always produce the
opposite result and push him to commit actions contrary to requirements
for a successful conclusion of the negotiations.
It is important to note that Barak’s
notion that Camp David was to represent “the” summit to end all summits,
an approach of all or nothing was fundamentally wrong. From the
beginning, the Palestinians were opposed to the Talks, and were dragged
into them by the Secretary of State and the President. The Palestinians
believed that the time was not ripe, and that the two sides were as not
yet ready for a concluding summit. Arafat was not aware of Barak’s
intentions, which produced rabbits and other gifts from his top hat.
When these were revealed in Camp David, the Palestinians were not ready
with concrete positions in reaction. It was therefore impossible to
reach an agreement at Camp David. From Arafat’s point of view, July was
too early a date to reach an agreement. His timeline was September or
November, with a preference for the latter. Tactically, his goal was to
continue with discrete negotiations, as in Stockholm, until the end of
the summer, and then to hold a number of summit meetings which would
reach their climax after the American elections, when the President
would feel free of the influence of the Jewish vote, and not bound by
electoral obligations to his Vice President and the candidacy of his
wife in the Senate elections.
When the summit was forced upon him,
Arafat requested – but was unable to prevail – that there would be not
one but a series of summit meetings which would enable him to build a
coalition at home, both within the political elite and with the
Palestinian public. This need was not sufficiently apparent to, nor
recognized by, the Israelis and the Americans. Towards the end of the
negotiations in Oslo in the summer of 1993, Abu Mazen and Abu Ala were
also busy building an internal coalition. At the time, this coalition
building enabled Arafat to declare his support for the agreement. The
Palestinian leadership was then able use the combined force of his and
the coalition’s support in order to market the agreement to the lower
echelons of the leadership and to the Palestinian public. Without such
an internal coalition composed of elements within Fatah and the PLO,
Arafat cannot sign an agreement.
In the period leading up to Camp
David, the Palestinian leadership was divided over, and engaged in, an
internal struggle over who would lead the negotiations, but no less on
who would be the heir to Arafat. Israel did not know how to maneuver in
this context, and was seen to be involving itself in internal
Palestinian politics. One of the Americans’ worst mistakes was that they
also seemed to be taking a stand on this issue. They appeared to be
grooming Mohammed Dahlan, the Head of Preventive Security Forces in
Gaza, at the expense of number two in Fatah, Abu Mazen. In the final
event, this struggle adversely affected the functioning of the
Palestinian delegation. At certain points – both within the negotiations
proper and outside them – various Palestinians presented harsh
positions, which were designed to hurt their colleagues by making them
appear too lenient.
Insufficient and amateur preparation
combined with unclear proceedings was not only characteristic of the
Palestinian side. The Israeli side, for example, arrived at the summit
without being prepared on the complex and sensitive issue of Jerusalem.
Barak justified the lack of preparation, stating that he feared “leaks”
would result in political attacks accusing him of dividing the city. The
negotiators were not familiar with the possible models of solutions or
with the physical terrain in and around Jerusalem. This mistake was
exacerbated when the Prime Minister decided to direct the discussions,
at the summit, to an exaggerated focus on Jerusalem and, specifically,
on the most sensitive issue of the Temple Mount/Harem-ash-Sharif. In
fact, the logic of the negotiations required the opposite approach. The
Palestinians were prepared to reach an agreement on all the other
issues, and to leave the two most sensitive issues (the Temple Mount and
the Right of Return of the Palestinian refugees) for the end of the
negotiations. This setup would have provided both sides with a clear
balance of the gains and losses involved, and would have urged them to
reach an agreement on these sensitive issues. Instead, Barak adopted the
opposite approach, adding fuel to the fire in the form of an Israeli
demand to change the religious status quo in the area of
Harem-ash-Sharif by building a Jewish synagogue within the boundaries of
the sacred compound. Such an act had not been contemplated for two
thousand years, since the destruction of the Temple in 70 AD.
It should be emphasized that the
Palestinians made extremely significant mistakes that adversely effected
the negotiations, with regard to these issues. These mistakes rendered
the Israeli public suspicious of the Palestinians’ strategic aims, and
advanced a process whereby the average Israeli removed his support from
Barak and from permanent status negotiations. On the issue of the Temple
Mount, Arafat and the Palestinian negotiating team should not have
expressed doubts about the importance and holiness of the Temple Mount
for the Jewish people. The legitimate Palestinian claim for sovereignty
over the Harem-ash-Sharif was not strengthened by the inconsiderate
attempt to ignore the historic Jewish connection to the site.
The second issue proved even worse.
Excited Palestinian declarations regarding the Right of Return of every
refugee to the State of Israel created a suspicion among the vast
majority of the Israeli public, from left to right, that the Palestinian
intention remains to eradicate the Jewish state using a Trojan horse in
the form of the Right of Return. The extreme Palestinian positions
united Israeli-Zionist society. It appeared as an attempt to destroy the
foundation on which the Oslo concept was based: the principle of two
states for two peoples, the mutual recognition of the right for
self-determination of the Palestinian people, and the legitimacy of a
national home for the Jewish people. Climbing the high tree of the total
Right of Return and the subsequent debate based on extreme positions
foreign to those taken by the Palestinians throughout the negotiations
beginning in Oslo and until this period, constituted a major blow to the
negotiations. The Palestinians touched upon two highly sensitive Israeli
nerves: the religious and the national damaging themselves and the
possibility of reaching a Permanent Status agreement.
The Palestinians were also found lacking
in the tactical negotiations. In doing so, they did not help those in
the Israeli political system who were trying to convince the Prime
Minister to go the full distance in order to reach an agreement. The
Palestinians changed the head of delegation on several occasions, and
presented demands and positions, which later turned out only to
represent the positions, and reflect the interests, of the negotiator at
the time. Throughout the negotiations, the Palestinian team conveyed a
feeling that there was no end to Palestinian demands and that this
pressure would continue to increase as the conclusion of an agreement
neared. Those who negotiated with the Palestinians in the past were
familiar with this tactic. Its aim is to exhaust the path of
negotiations up to the decision-making point when it is time to sign.
The Israeli negotiators, however, felt that the rug had been drawn out
from under them, even with regard to proposals that had already been
agreed upon.
As negotiations advanced, Prime Minister
Barak understood that to reach an agreement he must adopt an approach
based on correcting mistakes while in full motion. Such a “correction”
was first observed in the nomination of Adv. Gilad Sher as Chief
Negotiator and that of Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami as the Head of the
Israeli Delegation. Further “corrections” occurred immediately following
Camp David, when it became clear that the negotiations with the
Palestinians could and should be continued, even though the Prime
Minister earlier had announced the Israeli Camp David proposals to be
null and void. Barak also realized that he should make use of more
experienced people, whom he had refused to involve in the past. This
resulted in the establishment of the peace cabinet, which included
Ministers Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin – who had gained vast experience
since the beginning of the Oslo Process. Beilin’s involvement in the
last-minute negotiations at Taba – albeit successful – apparently came
too late.
The negotiations in Taba, which took
place moments before Barak’s government lost the elections, proved that
a permanent status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians was
within reach. The distance between the two sides narrowed during the
last week of negotiations in Taba, and the climate in which the
discussions were conducted was reminiscent of the approach, which was
adopted during the Oslo talks. In effect, this lead to dramatic progress
on all issues on the agenda, in almost all the most important issues.
The talks did not end in an explosion, but rather in the feeling that
the time remaining would not enable the two sides to reach a written and
signed agreement. On the delicate issue of the Palestinian refugees and
the right of return, the negotiators reached a draft determining the
parameters and procedures for a solution, along with a clear emphasis
that its implementation would not threaten the Jewish character of the
State of Israel. In the territorial dimension – which constitutes the
main basis for any agreement – the new maps presented by the two sides
were closer than ever before to an agreed-upon borderline. Israel
reduced its demands to 6% but still insisted on merely symbolic and
minimal territorial compensation, while the Palestinians agreed to an
Israeli annexation of approximately 3% along with a territorial
compensation of the same amount. Had the Taba approach been tried from
the onset of Barak’s tenure, we could today be on the road to peace.
The Intifada
Since September 29, 2000,
Israeli-Palestinian relations entered a phase of a collapse of the peace
process paradigm. The second Palestinian Intifada erupted, leaving both
publics deeply shaken, and leading to Barak’s downfall and the breakdown
of permanent status negotiations. This is first and foremost the result
of a double misperception. The Palestinian side reached the mistaken
conclusion that the Israeli public and Barak were not prepared to pay
the price necessary for a genuine agreement and peace. Both the Israeli
public and the Prime Minister were in fact willing to go the necessary
distance, on the condition that the Palestinians expressed publicly the
conciliatory positions which they had stated privately, and that they
demonstrated non-tolerance and determination in combating terrorism. The
Israeli side, for its part, reached the mistaken conclusion that the
Palestinians did not want peace, and were instead bent on destroying the
Zionist State both from within and from outside it. Israel concluded
that there was no partner for peace on the Palestinian side, or at least
not one would who had the ability or the will to pursue it. In reality,
the Palestinians had not altered their basic position held since 1993,
calling for a two-state solution based on a non-militarized state along
the 1967 borders with a pragmatic solution to the refugee problem.
The Fatah leadership, which led the
uprising and represents the Palestinian “street”, was more frustrated
than anyone. The Fatah and the Tanzim (the local organizational base of
the Fatah) were, and remains, Arafat’s support base on the road to
peace, which he has followed since September 1993. The Fatah leadership
believed in the Oslo Agreement as the stepping-stone to a “liberation of
the land” through a just peace. They therefore took upon themselves to
market the Agreement to the public, and assumed a moral responsibility
for its implementation. Consequently, once they reached the conclusion
that the process was not leading towards the fulfillment of these goals,
they felt that they bore the responsibility for what they viewed as a
barren process and even an historical trap. For seven years, they had
defended the peace process and fought for it in Palestinian towns,
villages and refugee camps, and against opposition from right (Hamas)
and left (the rejection front), out of a belief that it would result in
a Palestinian state, peace and economic growth. The explosion was only a
matter of time once they concluded that Israel wasn’t a partner for
peace, that the negotiations were being dragged on, that building in the
settlements had accelerated and that the hope for a state had
evaporated. The Fatah feared that it would lose its strength opposite
Hamas, and preferred in this context, and as a movement for national
liberation, to lead the uprising rather than to be dragged into it by
Hamas.
It is our duty as Israelis to observe
the equation also from the Palestinian perspective. As long as the
Palestinian side maintained hope, based on the continuing negotiations,
the Palestinian leadership could persuade its public that there is a
light at the end of the tunnel, and that the suffering is worthwhile in
order to achieve a fair agreement and a just peace, without settlements
or occupation. Once the public saw this light had been extinguished,
frustration and despair took the place of hope, and the Intifada
erupted.
Conclusion
This paper has presented the problems
and obstacles met by the Oslo process since September 1993. It would,
however, be inaccurate to conclude from the critical description in this
paper that the Oslo process and the options it offered for a permanent
status agreement were faulty by design. This paper argues that the Oslo
approach and its objectives, which were introduced during Yitzhak
Rabin’s tenure, were never rightly implemented and should therefore not
yet be discounted.
The faulty implementation during
Netanyahu’s administration, and the problematic management of permanent
status negotiations under Barak are the two main obstacles, which
prevented the sides from reaching an agreement. Other obstacles included
Palestinian insensitivity to the Israeli perception of the daily threat
of terrorism to their personal security; Israeli insensitivity to the
suffering of an entire people possessed with a collective pride and
struggling to gain national liberation from continuing occupation; the
destructive effect of anti-Israeli incitement and propaganda; and a
fledgling Palestinian political system which acted negligently and
employed a double language. These factors enabled the deterioration of
the situation into violence.
Nevertheless, the possibility of
reaching an agreement remains. The Oslo Agreement represents the link
between the era of conflict and the era of peace. The Oslo process
brought about an historical change in the Israeli-Arab conflict,
including the peace agreement with Jordan and a process of recognizing
Israel’s legitimacy by the Arab world. The process also created an
Israeli-Palestinian consensus on a two-state solution based on the 1967
borders and on a process of reconciliation founded on a fair agreement
and common future interests. The period of the implementation of the
agreement and the results of the negotiations on permanent status were
supposed to represent the foundation for a comprehensive and lasting
peace agreement.
This foundation began to form, but
was crippled and was not realized. This did not result from a lack of
willingness of the Israeli and Palestinian publics to reach an
agreement, but from poor management of the process. If the two sides are
able to recognize their mistakes and learn from them, it will be
possible to renew the negotiations and to reach a permanent status
agreement which will represent the first leg on the long and difficult
journey to reconciliation between the two peoples and peace between
their two states.
haGalil onLine
22-08-2001 |